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Abstract
The network layer of ad hoc networks is prone to attacks. Insertion of false routing
information is inherently easy unless the routing messages are authenticated. Hence,
protection of the routing protocol is a prerequisite for a reliable network service.
The wireless broadcast media calls for bandwidth e¢ cient solutions. This paper
proposes a hybrid protection scheme for the ad hoc Optimized Link State Routing
protocol (OLSR). Identity-based signatures are combined with hash chains. Only
some messages are signed. Unsigned messages include a hitherto undisclosed value
from the hash chain as a lightweight proof of authenticity. The result is a bandwidth
e¢ cient scheme providing adequate protection.
Key words: Secure routing, ad hoc, authentication, hash chains,
identity-based signatures, performance
1 Introduction
Protection of the network layer in mobile ad hoc networks calls for unilateral
authentication of the routing messages. Possible solutions include symmetric
message authentication codes, traditional digital signatures and identity-based
signatures.
Symmetric schemes are e¢ cient both regarding computational e¢ ciency
and bandwidth consumption. However, with a single group key, the security
succumbs to a single captured node. Source authentication is precluded, and
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malicious insiders may masquerade as others. Furthermore, exclusion of com-
promised nodes is hard. The alternative of pairwise exclusive keys provides
better intrusion tolerance, but scales badly.
Asymmetric (public key) schemes enable revoction of single nodes and pro-
vide better protection against Byzantine behavior from insiders. A drawback
of traditional digital signature schemes is the potential need for bandwidth
consuming certi￿cate exchanges. The identity-based signature (IBS) schemes
make certi￿cates obsolete. If information such as IP-addresses that are by de-
fault transferred in the routing messages is used as public keys, identity-based
schemes may scale better than the certi￿cate based schemes.
In [7] it is shown how the signature sizes con￿nes the maximum size of the
network and possible routing message emission frequencies. Bandwidth e¢ -
cient solutions were sought. This paper proposes a hybrid protection scheme
for proactive link state routing protocols, and provides speci￿c formats for its
implementation with the optimized link state routing protocol (OLSR) [3].
The aim is a bandwidth e¢ cient solution providing an adequate level of se-
curity. Both the security and the performance of the protection scheme are
analyzed.
The hybrid protection scheme combines asymmetric, identity-based signa-
tures with shorter and computationally cheaper hash values from a hash chain
[11]. Bandwidth is saved by signing only some routing messages. Unsigned
messages include a hitherto undisclosed hash value from the chain. The val-
ues serve as lightweight proofs of authenticity, and make it hard for malicious
nodes to successfully insert additional and false routing messages on other
nodes￿behalf, even if not all messages are signed. The hash values also ease
sequence number wrap around detection and protect against replays.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. OLSR is described in sec-
tion 2 and threats are described in section 3. Section 4 outlines the basic
security mechanisms. In section 5 the hybrid protection scheme is described
and analyzed. The performance of the protection scheme is evaluated in sec-
tion 6. Related work is described in section 7. Conclusions and future work
are discussed in section 8.
2 The Optimized link state routing protocol (OLSR)
OLSR [3] is a proactive link state routing protocol designed for large and dense
mobile ad hoc networks. The packet and message formats are shown in Fig. 1.
Bandwidth consumption is optimized compared to classical ￿ ooding through
the use of Multipoint Relay (MPR) nodes. Only nodes that are chosen as
MPRs forward routing information. Each node selects MPRs from its 1-hop
neighbors in such a way that all 2-hop neighbors are covered by at least one
MPR node.
Each node broadcasts its links and MPR selections through HELLO mes-
sages. HELLO messages are not forwarded. Link state information is dis-
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Fig. 1. OLSR packet and message formats
seminated through Topology Change (TC) messages that are generated and
￿ ooded in the entire network by the MPR nodes. Routing tables are computed
from the information exchanged through the TC and HELLO messages. The
1-hop and 2-hop neighbors are detected from the HELLO messages. Routing
information concerning 3-hop nodes and more distant nodes are found from
the TC messages.
An OLSR node may have several network interfaces, but there is always one
main address identifying the node. The main address is used as the originator
address in all OLSR messages [3]. Other OLSR interfaces are announced
through Multiple Interface Declaration (MID) messages. These are visible
as source and destination addresses in the IP header. OLSR packets are
encapsulated in UDP over IP. Interfaces to non-OLSR networks are declared
through Host and Network Association (HNA) messages. Like TC messages,
MID and HNA messages are ￿ ooded by the MPRs.
3 Threats
The OLSR routing protocol is vulnerable to a number of attacks that can
be classi￿ed as Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. The attacks may aim at a
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single node, a group of nodes or the whole MANET. The threats originate
both from external malicious nodes as well as internal, legitimate members of
the network not behaving according to protocol. Possible attacks include:
Exhaustion: Insertion of routing information for the purpose of exhausting
other nodes or congesting the channel.
Route corruption: Insertion of bogus routing information or modi￿ed rout-
ing messages in order to corrupt the routing tables.
Replay: Retransmission of earlier routing messages to corrupt routes or
exhaust other nodes.
Blackhole nodes attract tra¢ c by falsely advertising they have the best
routes to others. The target may be control of the tra¢ c ￿ ow. Blackholes
may choose to forward routing information but not payload.
Masquerade, i.e. nodes pretending to be others, can be launch by replays
of old routing messages or insertion of bogus routing information. The aim
can be route corruption or node exhaustion.
Sel￿sh nodes refuse to forward or only selectively forward routing messages
from others and give priority to own tra¢ c.
Wormholes, set up by colluding nodes tunneling routing messages through
a high speed link from one part of the network to another, can make geograph-
ically distant nodes erroneously believe they are neighbors. The colluding
nodes may act as Blackholes.
Eavesdropping is assumed not to disturb routing. However, eavesdropping
can be used for tra¢ c analysis and monitoring of network topology. The
information learned could be utilized as background information for other
attacks.
Byzantine behavior refers to nodes that do not behave according to the
protocol. This includes insertion of false or modi￿ed routing messages, mas-
querade, sel￿sh behavior, delayed response and similar deviations from the
protocol.
4 Basic Security Mechanisms
Identity-based signatures (IBS): Identity-based Cryptography [18] removes
the need for certi￿cates whereas preserving the bene￿ts of public key systems.
IDs such as IP-addresses that are by default transferred in the routing mes-
sages can be used as public keys. The ￿rst identity-based signature (IBS)
scheme, introduced by Shamir [18], was derived from RSA [16]. More recent
schemes such as [4], [8], [14], and [17] are based on bilinear pairings.
During the setup phase of an identity-based scheme, the trusted entity,
the Private Key Generator (PKG), chooses a secret master key and generates
the corresponding public system parameters. Afterwards, in the extraction
phase, it issues private keys. The private keys are calculated by combining
the IDs and the private master-key of the PKG. Signatures, generated by the
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private key, are veri￿ed with the aid of the sender ID plus the public system
parameters.
Hash chains [11] are constructed by repeated hashes of an initial random
seed RND: h1=h(RND), h2=h(h1),...,hn￿1=h(hn￿2), hn=h(hn￿1). The hash
function h() is a cryptographic one-way function. The last value in the chain,
i.e. the hash anchor hn, is distributed through an authenticated channel. This
commitment enables its holder to verify whether later disclosed values origi-
nate from the same hash chain or not. Repeated hashes of the received value
should return the hash anchor. Forward hash calculation is fast and easy.
However, the one-way property makes it hard for anyone but the creator to
￿nd the preceding values in the hash chain.
5 A hybrid Protection Scheme for OLSR
5.1 Aim and assumptions
The aim of the hybrid protection scheme is a reliable network service. The
scheme seeks to balance bandwidth e¢ ciency and security. The routing mes-
sages are signed periodically. TC messages are signed when topology changes,
or periodically if no changes are detected. In addition, all routing messages
include a previously undisclosed value of a hash chain. The hash values make
it hard for malicious nodes to succeed in routing protocol attacks even if not
all messages are signed.
The hybrid protection scheme assumes an IBS scheme where the OLSR
main addresses are used as public keys, and the corresponding private keys
and system parameters have been derived by a separate key management
service. This implies a planned ad hoc network.
5.2 Sketch of protocol operation
Message formats: The message formats are shown in Fig. 1. The hybrid
protection scheme is based on the message sequence number (MSN) receipt
technique for replay protection suggested in [20], i.e. the HELLO messages
include not only the address of their neighbors but also the last MSN received
from them. Ref. [20] suggests the MSN ￿eld is extended from 16 to 32 bits to
avoid MSN wrap-around during network operation. The hash chain removes
the need for more bits in the sequence number ￿eld. The hash value will prove
whether a message with a lower MSN than previously received is fresh or not.
If all messages were either hashed or signed and hashed, and the signature
and hash sizes are ￿xed, one bit would be enough to signal signature type
to the receivers. A more general format is suggested with the SType and
Signature&Hash size ￿elds shown in Fig. 1. The SType ￿eld can be used
to signal signature type plus con￿guration parameters such as signature and
hash algorithms and the maximum interval between signed messages.
Hash anchor distribution: The ￿rst hash value received in a signed
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message is stored in the receiver as the hash anchor of that originator. Note
that this value does not have to be the original anchor of the chain. The hash
value in every signed message represents a refreshed hash anchor.
MSN and the length of the hash chains: The hash chains are made
long enough to avoid initialization of new chains during network lifetime. This
is both to ease MSN wrap-around recognition and to increase the robustness
to packet losses. If a signed message is lost, the receiver can still verify the
hash value of the next message received.
Whereas a single hash operation is computationally cheap, long hash chains
imply more processing in the sender node. That is to ￿spool￿from the seed
to the wanted value when a new message is prepared. A trade o⁄ between
work load and storage space is made by storing some intermediate values of
the hash chain. The sender then only has to ￿spool￿from the closest stored
value in the chain.
Routing message processing: When a signed message is received and
the signature check fails, the message is discarded. Otherwise, the receiver
stores the hash anchor and the message sequence number (MSN). When
hashed messages are received, the node veri￿es that repeated hashes of the
received value return the hash anchor. Subtracting the stored MSN number
from the received MSN value provides the number of repeated hashes required.
1) Local messages: When a new 1-hop neighbor is detected, but it has
not yet been authenticated through a signed HELLO message, the neighbor
and the link are set to ￿non-veri￿ed￿ . Still, if the hash value can be veri￿ed,
i.e. a hash anchor has been received through ￿ ooded messages or the node
has been in the neighborhood recently, the neighbor is accepted as a sym-
metric neighbor. In case no hash anchor is available, the link status is set to
asymmetric until the link has been authenticated through a correctly signed
HELLO message. MPRs are chosen among the authenticated nodes only, and
only authenticated nodes are accepted as MPR selectors.
2) Flooded messages are accepted over symmetric links only. The MPRs
only ￿ ood messages from their authenticated MPR selectors, and only authen-
ticated neighbors are advertised in the TC messages. TC messages are ￿ ooded
regularly. TC messages announcing topology changes are signed. The TC mes-
sages are also signed if no topology changes have been detected within a given
period. If a topology change is detected in an unsigned hashed message (the
signed message may have been lost), the new entry is marked ￿non-veri￿ed￿ .
The status is changed to ￿veri￿ed￿when a correctly signed message is received.
Correctly signed messages take precedence over unsigned messages.
HNA and MID messages are signed periodically. The contents of these
messages are expected to change little over time. Most messages will be used
to refresh earlier entries. When a new interface-to-main address association
is listed in an unsigned hashed MID message, the new entry in the multiple
interface association base is marked ￿non-veri￿ed￿ . When a corresponding
entry is received in a signed message, the status is changed to ￿veri￿ed￿ .
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In case of con￿ icts, veri￿ed entries take precedence over non-veri￿ed. HNA
messages are treated similarly. Veri￿ed entries are preferred as gateways.
5.3 Security analysis
The cryptographically signed routing messages provide source authentication
and proof of integrity. They also provide fresh, authenticated hash anchors.
The hash values do not guarantee the integrity of the messages, but make
successful attacks harder then when the messages are left unsigned. The
receivers expect fresh values from the hash chains. Else, the messages are
discarded. The hash values make it impossible for malicious nodes to insert
additional messages on other￿ s behalf. The malicious nodes must wait for the
true originator to disclose the next value in the chain. In addition, modi￿ed
messages that arrive later than the original message are discarded. Hence, the
hash values make successfully timed attacks hard.
Local messages: Ideally, a node should not set the link status to symmet-
ric before the link has been authenticated through a signed HELLO message as
the routing tables are recalculated on detection of new 2-hop neighbors. How-
ever, accepting hash values as a temporary proof of trustworthiness makes
neighbor detection faster at the same time as it is not straight forward for
an attacker to launch an attack. The MPR selection is more important to
protect as these nodes act on behalf of others. This is accounted for as only
authenticated neighbors are accepted as MPRs and MPR selectors.
Some attack situations for local messages are shown in Fig. 2a).
Situation 1: The true originator node A is within 1-hop neighborhood of
the receiving node B. If the packet is not lost, the receiver will receive the
message from the true originator at the same time as any malicious node.
Any replay or modi￿ed messages received from the malicious node will arrive
later than the true message, and be discarded.
If the packet is lost on the way from A to B, the malicious node C may
retransmit a modi￿ed message. If the message is signed, any modi￿cation
will be detected by B. If it was left unchanged, node C basically improves
the connectivity. On the other hand, if the message was unsigned, node C
may succeed in introducing false information. That is, it requires C to spoof
the interface address of A, otherwise node B will detect that this packet was
received from a di⁄erent OLSR interface. This spoo￿ng is detectable by node
A. In addition, the next message received directly from A will remove any
false information introduced by C. Both with and without packet losses, the
hash values prevent C from introducing additional and unscheduled HELLO
message on A￿ s behalf.
Situation 2: Node C replays HELLO messages from node A recorded earlier
in another part of the network. If node B already has a fresher hash anchor
obtained through ￿ ooded message from A, the replayed message is discarded.
Furthermore, neither Byzantine insiders nor external attackers will be able
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Fig. 2. Attack situations (Node A true originator, Node B receiver, and Node C
attacker).
to produce a signed message from A including a fresh MSN-receipt from B,
which is required to establish a veri￿ed symmetric link.
Situation 3: Colluding nodes C1 and C2 forward tra¢ c between A and
B through a high speed link in a wormhole attack. If C1 and C2 retransmit
the messages unchanged, they may improve network connectivity. Still, they
could also act as Blackholes and forward routing information, but not payload.
Signatures are not enough to protect against wormholes. Precise time
information or location awareness or similar is required in order to mitigate
such attacks. Mobility also helps. We believe wormhole attacks are hard to
mount in ad hoc networks. Their importance should not be exaggerated.
Situation 4: Node A is out of 1-hop neighborhood of node B. A malicious
node C is placed between node A and node B. The malicious node may replay
the HELLO messages from A unchanged or forward modi￿ed versions. This is
the same as a wormhole attack, except that node C represents both ends of the
￿tunnel￿ . Unless C retransmits the messages on orthogonal OLSR interfaces,
nodes A and B will hear the retransmission by C. The hash values prevent
C from inserting additional and unscheduled messages on A and B￿ s behalf.
Signed messages erase any false information inserted by C.
Situation 5: A malicious node inserts false messages. The signature and
hash validations will fail.
Flooded messages: Some attack situations for ￿ ooded messages are
shown in Fig. 2b).
Situation 1&2: There is a malicious node C within the 1-hop neighborhood
of the neighbors A and B. This is parallel to situation 1 for local messages. The
hash values prevent C from successfully inserting additional and unscheduled
messages on the behalf of A (and B). With no packet losses, B will receive the
correct message from A at the same time as C, and discard any later modi￿ed
or unmodi￿ed duplicates. In order to make B ￿ ood false information from
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A it requires the packet was lost by B, and B is an MPR of node A, and C
spoofs A￿ s address. Such a masquerade can be detected, but not prevented
by A. However, more than one packet must be lost in sequence in order to
make B ￿ ood false topology information. This is as B expects TC messages
to be signed upon topology changes. It also requires A is a MPR (only MPRs
generate TC messages), and B must be its MPR.
Situation 3&4: In situation 3, the malicious node C represents a shorter
route from MPR A to the receiver, and forward the routing message to node
B before the message is received through an authenticated route. In situation
4 there is a malicious node between A and its MPR B. Situation 3 and 4 are
basically wormhole attacks where node C represents both ends of the ￿tunnel￿ .
C may succeed in temporarily introducing false information. Mobile nodes
make it harder for node C to succeed in a persisting attack. It requires C
to track both A and B and maintain the shorter route in situation 3 or keep
A and B strict 2-hop neighbors in situation 4. The hash values inhibit C in
introducing new messages from A before A has released the next value in the
hash chain. Signed messages erase any false information introduced by C.
Situation 5: Node C is two or more hops away from the originating MPR
A. When C receives a new hashed message; C can modify the contents and
retransmit the message. Still, it requires C to spoof the address of a symmetric
neighbor of node B. In addition, C must send the modi￿ed packet before the
true MPR forwards the (correct) message, as B will discard later duplicates.
The hash values make it impossible for C to insert a false packet on behalf of
the MPR before a new value in the chain has been received.
Concluding remarks: Evaluating the hash values before the computa-
tionally more expensive signature veri￿cation renders the hybrid scheme more
robust to node exhaustion attacks than schemes solely relying on asymmetric
signatures. Knowledge of the routing message emission rates and the reception
time of the last authenticated MSN can be used judge whether the received
MSN is reasonable or not. This stops possible hash calculation exhaustion
attacks.
Neither signatures nor hash values preclude sel￿sh nodes. It is hard to
judge whether an MPR failed to forward a packet due to sel￿shness or for
other reasons.
6 Performance
6.1 General assumptions and analytical approximations
The network topology information and method for calculation of channel uti-
lization are adopted from [19]. The network topology information in [19] was
obtained through calculations and simulations with the ns-2 network simula-
tor. The number of MPRs selected by each node was set 10-20% higher than
the minimum required by the standard protocol. Other simulation parameters
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were: Random Waypoint mobility model, maximum speed 20 m/s and pause
time 60s, nodes distributed over 1500mx300m, and transmission range 250m.
The performance calculations are based on the packet formats of the hybrid
scheme and standard OLSR shown in Fig.1. HNA and MID messages are
assumed to contribute little to the overall OLSR tra¢ c, and are therefore not
included in the calculations. No message aggregation is assumed, and the TC
intervals are set to 2,5*HELLO intervals. I.e., a HELLO interval of 2 seconds
implies 5 seconds between each TC message.
Whereas processor utilization is important, the analysis in [7] revealed
channel utilization as a more limiting factor for the applicability of asymmetric
signatures for protection of ad hoc routing messages. The replacement of some
of the asymmetric signatures with cheaper hash functions makes processor
utilization even less constraining. The focus of this paper is therefore on
channel utilization, and processor utilization is left out of further discussions.
The performance evaluation assumes asymmetric schemes and hash func-
tions of similar security levels, and is based on the parameter sizes proposed by
NIST[12], shown in table A.1 in Appendix A. Corresponding signature sizes
are found in table A.2 in Appendix A.
Shamir￿ s IBS expands the signature size with a factor of two compared to
RSA for the same modulus. Depending on implementation, the newer IBS
schemes from the parings such as [4], [8], [14], and [17] can provide shorter
signatures. In [12], the proposed hash sizes are twice the size of the symmetric
keys. This is for collision resistance. The threat to the hash chains in the
hybrid scheme is inversion of the one-way function (preimage resistance) rather
than collision resistance. Consequently, the hash sizes can be halved.
6.2 Channel utilization
The channel utilization is measured as the average fraction of a second a
channel is occupied by OLSR tra¢ c. The calculations assume IEEE 802.11b
with CSMA/CS-DSSS for the lower layers. OLSR tra¢ c is broadcast tra¢ c
with a data rate of 1Mbps. UDP, IP and 802.11 MAC headers add an overhead
of 8+20+34 bytes to each OLSR packet, respectively. In addition comes a
802.11b delay of 552us [10] per MAC frame. A collision and error free channel
is assumed.
The size of the TC messages is calculated under the assumptions that
every TC message advertises (N-1)*mSxRATE links (N equals the number of
nodes within 1-hop neighborhood and mSxRATE equal the MPR selector rate;
the average probability that a neighbor selects this node as its MPR). The
HELLO messages are assumed to include two di⁄erent link codes.
Fig. 3 shows the average channel utilization measured in fraction of a
second occupied by OLSR tra¢ c for various network sizes, security overheads
and signature to hash ratios. Fig. 3a) shows that most of the bandwidth
savings is obtained by the ￿rst hashed messages. Increasing the number of
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Fig. 3. Average channel utilization of the hybrid protection scheme
hashed messages to each signed message is most bene￿cial for the largest
signatures.
Whereas Fig. 3a) assumes the same signature to hash ratio for all message
types, Fig. 3b) includes the e⁄ect of di⁄erentiation on message types. The
notation ￿2048/112: H(1:3),TC(1:0)￿means every fourth HELLO messages
include a signature of 2048 bits and a hash value of 112bits. All TC messages
include a signature of 2048 bits, but no hash value. Likewise, 1024/0:(1:0)
refers to a pure signature scheme with 1024bits signatures added to both the
HELLO and the TC messages. The ￿gure shows that most of the bandwidth
gain is obtained through hashed TC messages rather than hashed HELLOs.
6.3 Discussions
As a rule of thumb, OLSR tra¢ c should not exceed 10% of the bandwidth.
The calculations indicate that signi￿cant bandwidth savings can be obtained
by introducing one or more hashed messages for every signed one. More
hashed messages per signed message are especially bene￿cial with the larger
signature sizes, more nodes in the network and increasing emission frequen-
cies. With increasing network sizes, the average number of TC messages grows
faster than the average number of HELLO messages per channel, and the cal-
culations show that the signed TC messages contribute more to the channel
utilization than the signed HELLO messages. As can be seen from Fig. 3b),
this di⁄erence is ampli￿ed with increasing network sizes. Through calcula-
tions, we found that the di⁄erence is also augmented with shorter routing
message emission intervals. (Experience has shown that the default HELLO
interval of 2s can be too long with mobile nodes). Hence, hashing the ￿ ooded
messages is desirable. Regarding local messages, under the assumption that
only authenticated neighbors are accepted as MPRs and MPR selectors, the
gain obtained by hashing the HELLO messages should be weighed against the
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potential added delay in the neighbor detection and MPR selection processes.
Whereas TC message signatures should be triggered by topology changes
or the maximum time since last signature is exceeded, the calculations as-
sume periodical (maximum time triggered) signatures. Further simulations
are required to con￿rm the average time between topology changes.
The calculations here only considered average channel occupation. That is,
(2048/80: (1:3)) would show the same average channel occupation as (1024/80:
(1:1)). However, the probability of congestion and packet losses may be higher
with the larger signature sizes. Generally, shorter signatures are preferred.
Furthermore, the calculations assumed an IBS scheme. But the ￿gures are
applicable to any signature scheme with the chosen signature sizes. If the IBS
scheme is replaced by a traditional digital signature scheme, the bandwidth
consumption of certi￿cate exchanges must be taken into consideration. An
estimate is found by adding the certi￿cate lengths to the signature sizes.
7 Related work
SOLSR [6], proposed by Hong, Hong and Fu, uses asymmetric signatures and
hash chains for the protection of OLSR. However, the SOLSR approach is dif-
ferent from the hybrid protection scheme. Similarly to the hybrid protection
scheme, the signatures in SOLSR cover all non-mutable ￿elds of the routing
messages. But SOLSR assumes all routing messages are signed. Bandwidth
e¢ ciency is not considered. The hash chains are used to protect the muta-
ble Time to live (TTL) and HopCount ￿elds, and do not serve as a proof of
authenticity of unsigned messages as in the hybrid protection scheme. Each
new SOLSR routing message contains both the seed and the anchor of a new
hash chain. The hash anchor is included in the signed part of the routing mes-
sage. The seed is updated by intermediate nodes. Hashing the seed received a
number of times equal to the di⁄erence between the TTL and the HopCount
should return the hash anchor. The hybrid protection scheme leaves the TTL
and HopCount ￿elds unprotected.
In our opinion there are some de￿ciencies with the SOLSR scheme. Accord-
ing to the OLSR RFC [3], intermediate nodes should decrease the TTL and
increase the HopCount ￿elds nodes before the routing message is forwarded.
However, whereas the hop count plays an important role in the calculations
of the shortest routes in distance vector routing protocols such as AODV[15],
there is basically no need to protect the TTL and HopCount ￿elds of OLSR.
The HopCounts are not used in the route calculations. Reducing the TTL
value by more than one means the packet will die sooner. Still, any node can
decide not to forward the packet, which kills it even faster. Increasing the
TTL will not lengthen the packet lifetime signi￿cantly. Duplicates of ￿ ooded
packets are detected on the basis of the message sequence numbers, and will be
discarded. Furthermore, SOLSR detects wormholes on the basis of observed
round-trip times. A wormhole is suspected if the round-trip time indicates
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the distance to its neighbor exceeds the maximum transmission range. How-
ever, it is not evident how one can judge whether an extra delay is caused by
lower layers normal media contention or an additional travel distance through
a wormhole tunnel.
The reactive distance vector routing protocol SAODV [21] uses hash chains
to authenticate the hop count, which is used to calculate the shortest routes.
In SLSP [13], hash chains are used to prevent topology information from being
distributed further than a speci￿ed number of hops.
In SEAD [9], a hash chain is used to ensure other nodes cannot retransmit
the routing message with a higher sequence number than just received or
with a shorter distance than currently received. Loose time synchronization
is required in order to prevent successful masquerade attacks with the use
of already disclosed hash values. In our scheme, hash chains are combined
with signatures and message sequence number receipts and periodic proactive
refreshes of the hash anchor (signed messages). This reduces the need for time
synchronization.
Whereas the hybrid protection scheme is based on the MSN-receipt tech-
nique in [20], Adjih et al. [1] and Hafslund et al. [5] propose time stamps
instead of sequence numbers for replay protection. In [19] it is shown in that
the MSN-receipt technique scales better than the time stamp solutions.
8 Conclusions and future work
Bandwidth e¢ cient security solutions are sought for ad hoc networks. The
hybrid protection scheme shows how hash values from a hash chain can be
combined with asymmetric identity-based signatures (IBS) into a bandwidth
e¢ cient security solution. The calculations showed that signi￿cant bandwidth
savings can be obtained even by in average hashing only every second routing
message instead of signing it. More hashed messages increase the savings.
The hybrid protection scheme mitigates persisting route corruption, ex-
haustion, masquerade, replay and black hole attacks from both externals as
well as (to some extent) internal legitimate members of the network. Although
not all routing messages are signed, the broadcasts nature of the routing pro-
tocol combined with the hash values make successful attacks harder. The hash
values also eases message sequence number (MSN) wrap-around recognition
and make replay attacks easier to detect. The hash values prevent attack-
ers from successfully inserting unscheduled routing messages on the behalf of
other nodes. However, under speci￿c circumstances, as discussed in the secu-
rity analysis, there is a risk that malicious nodes may succeed in temporarily
introducing false routing information. These attacks are not straight forward
to mount, and signed routing messages will erase any false information. TC
messages are expected to be signed if they include a topology change. It would
thus require two or more lost packets in sequence in order to insert false topol-
ogy information. A topology change from one hashed message to the next is
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suspicious.
Whereas the hybrid protection scheme is proposed for OLSR, we regard
the method as generic and applicable to other proactive link-state routing pro-
tocols as well. Furthermore, the IBS scheme could be replaced with a digital
signature scheme. Certi￿cate distribution must then be taken into consider-
ation. Bandwidth e¢ cient protection schemes for other routing protocols are
topics for further research.
The security levels suggested in [12] were used as an estimate for the per-
formance evaluation. However, a comprehensive framework for the decision of
appropriate key lengths in ad hoc networks is a topic for further investigations.
So is e⁄ective key management, including revocation.
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A Appendix: Security levels, hash lengths and signa-
ture sizes
(From NIST [12]:)
Security
level
(bits)
Hash
size
IFC &
TDL n
FFC
(SDL)
p/q
ECC
key
length
Safe un-
til year
80 160 1024 1024/160 160-223 2010
112 224 2048 2048/224 224-255 2030
Table A.1
Comparable security levels
Security level 80 112
Hash size 80 112
IFC&
DL
Cert. based RSA 1024 2048
IBS Shamir 2048 4092
SDL Cert.based DSA 160 224
ECC Cert. based ECDSA 320 448
Pairing BLS[2] 168
IBS based SOK[17],
Cha&Cheon[4],
Paterson [14],
Hess [8]
(320-2048)￿ (682-4092)￿
Table A.2
Hash lengths and signature sizes
￿) Depends on the embedding degree k of the torsion group (1￿k￿6).
IFC= integer factorization cryptography
TDL= traditional discrete log
SDL= subgroup discrete log
ECC= Elliptic curve cryptography
n= bits in modulus
p= bits in prime modulus
q= subgroup size
IBS= Identity-based signatures
Cert.= Certi￿cate
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